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Abstract  
This paper argues that propaganda poses a (new) challenge to civic education. It 
examines the tension between education and propaganda in relation to civic education 
for adults considering (1) civic education as protection against propaganda attempts and 
(2) propaganda as a possible element of civic education. This paper explores didactical 
approaches and core principles of civic education that strive to both resist and deal with 
propaganda. The core proposal of the paper is to root civic education in the tradition of 
the German concepts of Bildung and Mündigkeit in order to contrast civic education with 
propaganda or manipulation.  
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Introduction 
Civic education – for people of all ages – is based on the assumption that each democracy 
is reliant on active, autonomous, civically educated citizens. As things stand today, one 
of the core challenges of civic education is the question of how to equip adult citizens 
with the ability to deal with the omnipresence of propaganda. This challenge seems to 
require an explanation, because everyday life and the political systems in liberal 
democracies do not appear to be connected with propaganda. Propaganda, indoctrination, 
or manipulation mostly played a role in historical considerations or analysis of totalitarian 
societies.  Since the 2014 "hybrid war" of Russia in Ukraine, it has gradually become 
evident that propaganda and manipulation still present an important challenge for 
democracy today and thus for civic education. During this time, propaganda was one of 
the most important means of warfare, disseminated through a massive disinformation 
campaign in various forms of social media (known colloquially as “fake news”) and so-
called “troll factories” (see Gerber & Zavisca, 2016). According to the 2016 Annual 
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Imperva Incapsula Bot Traffic Report1, 51.8% of Internet traffic came from bots, while 
48.2% came from human users. Throughout the internet, automated scripts are buzzing: 
both advertising bots, which artificially increase the number of followers, and 
propagation robots spread “fake news”. 
The current situation is thus characterized by the fact that attempts to influence 
people’s attitudes and beliefs through massive disinformation campaigns are ubiquitous. 
The intended deception behind such disinformation, as in the case of so-called social bots 
and trolls, suggests propaganda attempts. According to Ferdinand Tönnies, the essence 
of propaganda lies in the agitation of public opinion in a “grand style”, which is intended 
to spread an opinion without regard for its truth and evidences (Tönnies, [1922]/1981, p. 
79).  
Propaganda was originally used in a neutral, rather than pejorative, sense as a means 
of disseminating ideals important for a special group. In 1622, Pope Gregory XV 
established the “Congregatio de Propaganda Fide” (Congregation for Propagating the 
Faith) for the purpose of promoting catholic religion in non-Catholic countries. The word 
“propaganda” later developed a negative connotation as a means to indoctrinate citizens. 
Stanley distinguishes between supporting and undermining propaganda, defining the 
former as a sort of discourse aiming at increasing the realization of some worthy political 
ideals “by either emotional or nonrational means” (Stanley, 2015, p. 53). He defines 
undermining propaganda as discourse that ‘undermines a political ideal by using it to 
communicate a massage that is inconsistent with it‘ (ibid., p. 57). Stanley refers to the 
WEB Du Bois’s paper “Criteria of Negro Art” (1926) as a prominent example of 
supporting propaganda. Here, Du Bois calls on the African-American artist to use 
“propaganda” along with emotional appeals to win the respect, empathy, and 
understanding of Whites (ibid., p. 58 f.). Following his examples of supporting 
propaganda, it can be argued that democratic ideals could be supported by propaganda. 
However, Stanley emphasizes that any form of propaganda ‘is a kind of manipulation of 
rational beings toward an end without engaging their rational will, so it is a kind of 
deception‘ (ibid.). 
This article will examine the tension between education and propaganda in relation 
to civic education for adults. The issue of propaganda is certainly significant for the 
education of different age groups. For adults, resistance to propaganda is essential if only 
because propaganda, which works subtly, undermines the foundations of civic action of 
adults, and thus their role as a citizen. The adult as a co-creator of the democratic order 
needs civic education, which maintains and strengthens abilities such as autonomous 
decision-making, critical reflection and analysis, as well as autonomous opinion 
formation and thus the ability to undertake deliberate and mature civic action. Civic 
education is considered to be the guarantor, but also a beneficiary of the liberal-
democratic order. Must it thus be an urgent current task of civic education to take a 
position on the outlined political and social change? Can (and should) education therefore 
reflect on and appeal to adults’ traditional values such as autonomy, responsibility, and 
the capacity for judgment in order to strengthen the ability of adults to identify, analyze 
and disprove propaganda and therefore immunize adults against propaganda attempts? 
How can adult education develop skills that are lacking in the adult population? These 
are key questions of this article. 
This article consists of two core parts. In the first part, after explaining the danger 
that propaganda poses to democracy, I will place propaganda in the context of civic 
education and democracy using two perspectives: that which considers civic education as 
protection against propaganda attempts and that which considers propaganda as a possible 
element of civic education. In the second part of this article I will discuss propaganda as 
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challenge of civic education and explore didactical approaches, core principles and ideas 
of civic education that strive to both resist and deal with this challenge.  
 
The outline of the problem 
Propaganda as a threat to democracy 
Democracy is based on the principle that participation in political processes and decision-
making is open to everyone. For the maintenance of democracy, it is essential that not 
only this participation, but also the corresponding deliberation and formation of opinions, 
is carried out without manipulative deception from any side: ‘A democratic culture is one 
in which citizens assume that their fellow citizens have good reasons for acting as they 
do’ (Stanley, 2015, p. 104). Democratic processes are legitimized by the existence of 
certain directives that are binding for all citizens, which must be the result of public 
discussion and participation to serve the common good. At the same time, it is obvious 
that discussions and deliberations based on deception or manipulation do not lead to 
legitimate decisions and therefore will not ensure legitimate democratic procedures. In 
his book How propaganda works (2015), the sociologist Jason Stanley calls for a 
scientific discussion of ideals and values that can serve as a foundation for public debate 
in order to find legitimate democratic rules (Stanley, 2015, p. 87).  
The concept of propaganda is understood as communication addressed to the larger 
groups of society that aims at influencing public opinion on controversial issues. 
Propaganda was described by the American historian Peter Kenez as ‘…an integral part 
of the modern world’ (Kenez, 1985, p. 4). Propaganda is thus a problem for educational 
processes given that, according to Jacques Ellul, propaganda by its very nature perverts 
the significance of events and insinuates false intentions (Ellul, 1962). In keeping with 
Ellul, propaganda is understood not only as the antithesis to education, but also as a 
challenge for education, which counteracts propaganda and other attempts of “seduction”.  
Hans-Jochen Gamm established the term "seduction" in a pedagogical discussion 
(Gamm, 1964) in order to characterize the nature of with which he characterized the 
educational practices and approaches of the Nazi dictatorship and the effects of Nazi 
ideology on the broad population. The "seductions" of today are certainly different from 
those described by Gamm in 1964 – at least in terms of content. Current propaganda is 
not aimed at the awakening of racial hate, at the production of obedience to a leader, or 
the breeding of a destructive drive against anything opposed to a racist ideology. 
However, people today must still be able to withstand the fears of an unmanageable 
world, seductive simulations and "alternative facts" as well as ignorant anti-
intellectualism. Another challenge today is handling new digital forms of information 
dissemination, which are an integral part of modern society. These forms, which influence 
‘public opinion in a grand style’ (Tönnies, [1922]/1981, p. 79), can create structures in 
which individuals and groups are irrationally guided by emotion, as was the case with 
propagandist mass events in totalitarian societies. In his study, the American education 
scientist Sam Wineberg even speaks of a "new reality", which demands a new "digital 
intelligence" in order to resist the manipulation and propaganda attempts of modern 
society (Wineburg & McGrew 2016).2 How education can address these challenges, what 
the educational implications will be for methods, content and values, to what limits 
education will confront these issues, and what ethical considerations may be necessary - 
these questions will be central to the second part of this article. Next, classic conceptions 
such as those presented by Bildung and Mündigkeit will be considered as an adequate 
answer to new problems (see below, p. 18), including those of the digital world.  
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Civic education as "protective umbrella" against anti-democratic threats  
Today it is hardly possible to imagine a life without digital search and fast-access 
information. The rapid availability of information, however, makes it necessary to 
critically examine the relevant facts and data. Therefore, competency is required when 
dealing with information disseminated by the media in order to analyze and reflect about 
the acquired knowledge – or, using Adorno’s term, it requires "education for maturity 
autonomy" [“Erziehung zur Mündigkeit3”] when handling this information. The latest 
book by Fareed Zakaria, In defense of a liberal education, underlines the current need to 
once again focus education on strengthening those skills that help us meet the challenges 
of the increasingly globalized world. According to Zakaria, there are three key skills that 
form a solid basis for acting in this fast-changing and unsafe world: (critical) thinking, 
(argumentative) speaking and writing, and (lifelong) learning. These are also the qualities 
included in the German concept of “Bildung” (in some cases translated as education)4 
developed by Humboldt and interpreted more broadly by Gadamer, Adorno, Holzkamp 
and other thinkers. This article will therefore refer to the German concept of “Bildung” 
(and to the related concept of “Mündigkeit”) to illustrate the distinction between (civic) 
education on one side and propaganda (and indoctrination) on the other. 
Civic education is considered – from the perspective of many actors in the fields of 
science, politics and society – to provide at least partial security against anti-democratic 
threats. Political education is often seen as a "protective umbrella" against radicalization 
and group-focused enmity (Hufer, 2011). It can also provide a means to the formation of 
mature (“mündig”), active, and reflective citizens (Deichmann, 2015), a means of dealing 
with information in a global society (Overwien & Rathenow, 2009), and the development 
of a self-conscious attitude within citizens.  
Likewise, civic education is considered to be an indispensable part of a democratic 
liberal society because it promotes its development and continuation. As Oskar Negt 
states: Democracy is the only social order that has to be learned – ‘again and again, day 
after day, for a lifetime’ (Negt, 2004, p. 197). A good civic education is able to provide 
this protection by fostering critical thinking within its citizens while pushing them to 
contemplate contradictions between appearance and reality in social and political life and 
also encouraging them resist, if necessary.  
American education scientist Galston argues that: ‘[t]he viability of liberal society 
depends on its ability effectively to conduct civic education’ (Galston, 1989, p. 92). The 
key word of his statement is “effectively” – but what does it mean to conduct civic 
education effectively? Questions about how effectiveness can be measured and other 
ethical concerns can arise in this context. Shall we accept any attempts of misusing 
pedagogical power by overwhelming students with pre-determined positions and beliefs, 
even for a good purpose? Civic education is obviously necessary, but how is it possible, 
given the societal diversity and plurality of world views? Stanley points out that ‘[i]n a 
managerial society, the greatest good is efficiency. In a democratic society, by contrast, 
the greatest good is liberty, or autonomy’ (Stanley, 2015, p. 20). 
To begin with the obvious: if the main goal of civic education is to enhance the 
autonomy and maturity of an individual and to foster the ability to think and to act for 
oneself, then there should be concerns that civic education might prioritize civic 
consensus for the sake of societal cohesion over the original objective of empowering 
individuals to disagree rationally with that which is simply seen as a “given”, following 
the concept of Mündigkeit by Adorno (Adorno, [1971]/2013). In the concept of Amy 
Gutmann civic education is limited by the requirements of “nonrepression” and 
“nondiscrimination” (Gutmann, 1989, p. 78 f.). Are these principles robust enough to 
protect the civic education from misuse?  
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We need to ask ourselves what bothers us when we think about propaganda. I would argue 
that we should differentiate at this point between propaganda in principle and its 
consequences. Propaganda bothers us in principle, because it thwarts our autonomy and 
agency and is therefore an affront to our independence and rationality as learners:  
To attempt to thwart the goals someone has qua rational moral agency is to fail to respect 
her rational moral agency. And since a person’s rational moral agency is crucial to her 
personhood, to fail to respect it is to degrade her; it is to treat her as less than a person. 
(Noggle, 1996, p. 52) 
Propaganda also disturbs us if we consider the consequences of the way that an 
indoctrinated person acts and behaves in a community or society - without the ability to 
question doctrines or explore other alternatives, without developed agency and autonomy, 
but at the same time confronted with the complex challenges and uncertainties of a 
modern society. Propaganda is therefore of special concern for the field of civic 
education, where we connect with education our expectation of the development of 
autonomous, rational, competent citizens who are able and willing to make well 
reasonable, well-thought-out and mature decisions.  
 
Propaganda as a part of civic education? 
Civic education is never neutral, as it advocates for democracy. It is barely possible to 
imagine a neutral stance on such issues as human rights, human dignity, slavery, or racism. 
It is not unusual for civic education to be focused on different methods of teaching, 
learning and supporting rational inquiry rather than special content. Civic education starts 
with the experience of learners and provides them with the tools they need to analyze 
their own situation and to convert a personal situation into a political issue.  
Civic education is however still in danger of being civic propaganda or even civic 
indoctrination. Sears and Hyslop-Margison wrote an article about “The Cult of 
Citizenship Education” in which they claimed that the discourse surrounding citizenship 
education used false crises and the language of crisis, sloganeering, committing to a cult 
mentality, oversimplifying, and demonizing opponents in order to achieve its goals. 
(Sears & Hyslop-Margison, 2006). The fact that civic education could “overact” and 
become coercive and simplified should not be overlooked. Civic education demands that 
an educated, autonomous person search for truth and make intelligent choices that further 
her or his interests. Propaganda is often defined as a method of influencing people that 
attempts to bypass their reason and critical faculties, and therefore does not appeal to 
Mündigkeit, but reinforces the opposite - Unmündigkeit. Most importantly, propaganda 
follows the pleasure principle It works by steering those who are susceptible to its ideas 
toward a conclusion which is to be accepted without objection For this reason, it 
simplifies, is one-sided, tends to illusion, conceals, embellishes, offers stereotypes, 
presents itself as faultless and turns as a whole, because it can here most likely to be 
successful, appealing to the so-called deep person, to the emotions in people, to the 
existing needs and impulses, to the unfulfilled wishes which they claim to satisfy, not so 
much to the critical and ever-recurring mind; It seeks to persuade by stubborn repetition 
of its slogans, or by means of flattering images and affective signals; It seeks to avoid 
conflicts, hide alternatives, occupy consciousness with urgent short-formulations, etc. 
(Kuckartz & Sprey, 1969, p. 50). Kuckartz and Sprey, however, go so far as to attest to 
the similar motives and techniques of education, especially to education, which by 
methods “suitable for children” makes every effort to “get to the child” (ibid.):  
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It [Education] is developing ever more elaborated methods of childhood, youth and 
adulthood appropriateness. It benefits from all pedagogically relevant results of 
anthropological research which have to secure the conditions of its success; It is 
increasingly taking advantage of a roundabout route through images and other emotionally 
appealing methods. (ibid., p. 51)  
The theory of adult education as well as its practice is equally concerned with questions 
how to enable and support learning in the adulthood, how to foster receptivity and 
susceptibility of adults towards new knowledge and experience, how to overcome 
“learning barriers”. It seeks to develop methods of teaching suited to adult learner.  
The second part of this article will argue that teaching methods considered adequate 
for adults should be strictly oriented towards the autonomy and independence of the adult 
learner, which at the same time will strengthen the capacity to resist against manipulation 
and propaganda. The thesis of this article is thus that civic education aimed at preparing 
adults to deal with propaganda should include the principles and values described by the 
German concepts of Bildung and Mündigkeit. After providing different perspectives on 
the aims and functions of civic education I will briefly clarify its connection to the 
principles of Bildung and Mündigkeit, discuss its didactic principles, and outline the core 
ethics of civic education that seek to avoid propaganda and to protect adults against it.  
 
Principles and strategies of dealing with propaganda in civic education 
The purpose of civic education and its role in a democracy   
William Galston differentiated between “philosophical education“ and “civic education“, 
defining the first as aimed at seeking truth and increasing capacity for rational inquiry 
(Galston, 1989, p. 89) and the latter as the ‘formation of individuals who can effectively 
conduct their lives within, and support, their political community’ (Galston, 1989, p. 90). 
Galston claims that philosophical education is universal and not ‘decisively shaped by the 
specific social or political circumstances’ (ibid.), but it can also have ‘corrosive 
consequences for political communities’ because ‘pursuit of truth […] can undermine 
structures of unexamined but socially central beliefs’ (Galston, 1989, p. 90). Civic 
education is, on the contrary, ‘within, and on behalf of, a particular political order’ and 
does not ‘stand in opposition to its political community’ (ibid., p. 90). Galston’s 
classification can be accused of fostering a very narrow notion of civic education, but he 
does raise the important issue of a potential clash between rational inquiry and civic 
education if civic education is understood as a confirmative, (rather than, for example, 
subversive) element of education. Galston specifies, however, that ‘liberal democracies, 
in particular, are founded on principles that can survive rational inspection, and their 
functioning is facilitated (or at least not crucially impaired) by impeded inquiry in every 
domain’ (Galston, 1989, p. 90). Still, he holds the notion of civic education as an 
affirmative commitment.  
Intuitively, we may tend to equate philosophical education as defined by Galston 
with the concept of “Bildung“ (as it was defined by Humboldt, see below), while at the 
same time shifting civic education towards the pole of manipulation and 
instrumentalisation. Bildung is concept that implies as a condition sine qua non the 
attempt to capture the world in all its diversity, but also the specific given circumstances 
and the ability to shape this world. Using Galston’s definitions and placing civic education 
only in the realm of supporting and consenting action would mean to narrow the very 
notion of civic education. Civic education for its part is understood by the prominent 
scholars as education aimed towards opposition (Hufer), which empowers participants to 
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question political communities and to change them or even to resolve them (in some 
extreme cases). Klaus-Peter Hufer claims:  
To my mind, civic (German: political education, TK) education is always critical, otherwise 
it would be neither civic nor education. It would be training, indoctrination or agitation with 
the aim of forcing the participants to conform, it would not be education, but its opposite. 
(Hufer, 2013, p. 120)  
He claims that formulating criticism is already part of the concept of civic education itself. 
Basically, the common creed in civic education (at least in the German contexts) is the 
conviction that it should contribute to the (political) autonomy (“Mündigkeit”) of the 
citizens. Autonomy means in this case that one can form an independent judgment on 
political issues and become aware of ways to participate politically. Civic education is 
therefore not aimed at simply supporting and strengthening political communities, but 
also implies a necessary element of intelligent criticism - thus it is routed in the concept 
of Bildung.  
 
The relationship between civic education and Bildung 
Bildung is supposed to be an open-ended process and could not be predetermined as an 
act of creation. The main goal of classical Bildung (understood in the tradition of 
Humboldt) is to give a person individual form or strength while developing his or her 
powers – and thus does not allow a person to be the object of any extrinsic vision. A 
human being should strive, according to Humboldt, to ‘embrace as much of the world as 
possible and to unite himself as closely as he can with it’ (Humboldt, 1903, p. 283). 
Humboldt therefore describes Bildung as binding oneself to the world in order to achieve 
the most common, living and unlimited interaction – the interaction between individual 
[human] receptivity and self-activity. The modern concept of Bildung considers education 
as targeting an active, autonomous person and his or her interactions with the material 
and social environments. Bildung is thus an open, self-reflective, never-ending process 
involving self-development through encounters with the unknown. According to 
Horkheimer, education is a pursuit of inner freedom. ‘The desire for Bildung contains the 
will to become powerful within oneself, to be free from blind powers, apparent ideas, 
obsolete concepts, and dismissed views and illusions’ (Horkheimer, 1981, p. 160). 
Furthermore, the central aspect of the Bildung tradition is a critical attitude towards the 
tendency of instrumentalism in educational policy and concepts. Instrumental thinking 
looks at learning primarily as a means to achieve "useful goals" or "results," and these 
results are often associated with economic metrics. Bildung, in contrast to the 
instrumental perspective, focuses on reaching autonomy along with personal 
development, growth, autonomy, and refinement. There is a “utopian hope” which is 
described in the classical concept of Bildung and entails a “pathetic” element: ‘Education 
[…] goes beyond the existing society - to a society of free and equal [persons], in which 
the humanity of the human being can emerge on the horizon of mankind’ (Peukert, 1998, 
p. 19). 
Education (combined with emancipatory cognitive interest), rational deliberation, 
and humane ways of life were considered by Habermas to comprise part of the path 
toward change in a society. The formation of (individual and collective) identity can be 
seen as a continuous learning process through critical reflection. Habermas pits his hope 
on  “deliberative politics”, that is, a process which is essentially based on the informed 
decisions of citizens that are made through democratic processes. These processes must 
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therefore be as fair as possible and must be “herrschaftsfrei” (“free of domination”), 
meaning that the participants of a deliberative communication are free in their thinking 
and judging and do not have any special privileges. The central element of the discussion 
is the argument obtained in pursuing the truth.  Thus, this vision presupposes that citizens 
will maintain a constant interest, critical (self-)reflection and commitment, but also a 
special kind of education. The education and structures of society should be therefore 
shaped in a way that individuals (especially in their role as citizens) can be adequately 
qualified to exercise their autonomy (Habermas, 1992, p. 503). Education (in a broad 
term) therefore has a compensatory function: to strengthen knowledge, communicative 
skills, the commitment to common aims and values, and the capacity for critical reflection 
and assertiveness as well as self-belief and autonomy (ibid, p. 494 f.). 
Within the German context, traditional theories of Bildung embrace the processes 
that involve transformation and development of the learner’s personality and the 
transformation of one’s relation to the world. Humboldt speaks of man’s receptiveness 
and self-activity, therefore referring to both the process of understanding the world and 
the process of changing and designing the world. In this sense Bildung means dealing 
independently with beliefs and opinions – without indoctrinative coercion. It implies at 
least two dimensions: argumentative integration of something initially foreign into the 
horizon of the own world, and independent thinking and judging which enables one to 
relate to the issues at hand. The fundamental structure of every process of Bildung is the 
fact that every person should deal independently with things that are external to him or 
her. It is the process of world’s disclosure (“Erschließung” as Buber puts it). Bildung 
therefore does not come from the acceptance of an external doctrine or piece of 
knowledge, but from the fact that something “opens” itself to a person which demands 
that the person expose him or herself to the world. Bildung is the persistent preoccupation 
with what is at first glance strange. Bildung means (open-ended) changes: through the 
process of receiving and producing the person changes him or herself, while also altering 
the world. Buber distinguishes between disclosure (“Erschließung“) and the imposition 
(“Auferlegung“) (Buber, 1973, p. 284f.). According to Buber, there is two ways of 
influencing the people and their attitudes: The first is imposing one's attitude and opinion 
on person he or she may adopt these imposed thoughts and reflect on this way of thinking 
as if it were his or her own. The second way is developing what a person has recognized 
in him or herself as good. Because it is good, it must also be alive in the microcosm of 
the other person as a ‘possibility under possibilities’ (ibid.). A person must only be opened 
up to this possibility through encounter, rather than instruction. The first way is for Buber 
close to the field of propaganda, the second corresponds to education. 
For Humboldt the person and the citizen are not one as it was considered in Ancient 
Greece; but rather he ranks the person and personal development first: ‘Humboldt argues 
that persons educated to free individuals will ultimately be better citizens than men 
educated to be citizens […]’. (Sorkin, 1983, p. 64). Sorkin underlines hence the 
interdependence between the inward Bildung and the outward societal structure and the 
civic activity of a person in the given society:  
In order for the individual to achieve and maintain that condition, the ideal of Bildung 
necessarily incorporated a vision of regenerated social relations. Society was to be recast 
to facilitate and foster self-cultivation, guaranteeing the freedom, autonomy, and harmony 
it required. (Sorkin, 1983, p. 66) 
Sorkin argues that Humboldt’s concept of “zweckfreie Bildung” (education for its own 
sake) seems to be oriented inwardly, though it also implies the “civic conception”: 
‘Though social ties are the societal precondition for Bildung, the individual who has 
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achieved harmony in turn reacts upon society, and reshapes it according to the standard 
of that harmony’ (Sorkin, 1983, p. 68). So, a developed (gebildete) person acts politically 
by judging and improving the conditions of the society or entity in which he or she lives. 
However, Humboldt was opposed to a purely political education (“rein politische 
Erziehung”), suspecting that Bildung would be subordinated and would lose its 
sovereignty to the patriotic education – the very problem which he elaborated upon in his 
essay Decline and Fall of the Greek Free State.  
There are several practical examples of the prioritizing of human development over 
civic purposes (be they as noble and relevant as they may). One historical example is 
given by the famous Highlander Folk School in Tennessee, which is considered to be a 
hotbed for civic talents during the Civil Rights Movement in the USA. Myles Horton, the 
founder of this school, hoped to create a center for adult civic education which would 
foster the potential of adults to challenge an unjust social system affecting their lives. I 
want to briefly consider what the approach of Horton’s school can teach us about the 
challenge of dealing with propaganda in an adequate way. Although Horton himself never 
spoke about propaganda, I will claim that his pedagogy could be considered as a useful 
tool to face this problem nowadays. Horton aimed to help adults become empowered, 
think and act for themselves, and change conditions they didn’t want to accept. The people 
who attended Highlander included many of those who sparked the Civil Rights 
Movement: Septima Clark, Rosa Parks, Bernice Robinson, Martin Luther King, Jr., Esau 
Jenkins, and Andrew Young. There are, of course, some tensions between the two main 
goals of the Highlander Folk School: organizing and development. In general terms, the 
involvement of the community in these controversial discussions and deliberations helps 
the participants to go beyond the discussed issues and develop their cognitive, emotional 
and critical skills. At the same time, development (learning) as such can also divert 
attention from the active struggle for a urgent issue. Horton supports these dual 
components while emphasizing the principal indispensability of education as a person-
oriented process. Horton believed that education was the key to social justice and the new 
social democratic order. Nevertheless, his vision of education was not instrumental, but 
aimed at fostering personal growth and development of citizens so that they were prepared 
to face all kind of social and political challenges: 
I’d say if you were working with an organization and there’s a choice between the goal of 
this organization, or the particular program they’re working on, and educating people, 
developing people, helping them grow, helping them become able to analyze – if there’s a 
choice, we’d sacrifice the goal of organization for helping the people grow, because we 
think in the long run it’s a bigger contribution. (Horton & Freire, 1990, p. 116)  
His ideal was not to inculcate knowledge and beliefs into the adults’ mind, but to let them 
think for themselves and find their own ways of dealing with problems. Horton tells 
stories about having a gun pointed at him while angry strikers screamed at him to tell 
them what they should do. Horton instead insisted that he did not know what they needed 
to do - they had to find their own solutions for themselves (Horton & Freire, 1990). My 
argument is that Horton educated the adults so that they were prepared to examine various 
positions and solutions critically. He also encouraged them to lead and make significant 
contributions to their own discussions, and not to take any piece of knowledge for granted. 
Consequently, he developed an adult education institution that can be considered a prime 
example of inoculation against manipulation and propaganda.  
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The relationship between civic education and Mündigkeit 
The core concept of the epoch of Enlightenment, related to Bildung, is the idea of or plea 
for Mündigkeit which involves freedom of thought and freedom to make own moral 
decisions. Kant was one of the first to try to define “Mündigkeit”, but he does not speak 
about “Mündigkeit”, but about “Unmündigkeit”, and thus defines the term ex negativo. 
Unmündigkeit (often translated as tutelage) results, according to Kant’s famous quotation, 
from a lack of the resolution, commitment and courage needed to use one’s own reason 
without direction from another. Every single person therefore needs to have enough 
courage the think and act independently on the basis of his or her own decisions: ‘Dare 
to know’ is thus the famous motto of the Enlightenment (Kant, 1784).  
In Kant, however, this regulative idea of Mündigkeit cannot be understood as a condition 
or a goal of education to be attained by the development of competences, but rather as a 
permanent task of self-liberation from immaturity, as a courageous, uncomfortable process 
of emancipation, deviation and criticism from traditions and prescribed doctrines. (Eis, 
2016, p. 115) 
This reference to reason is interwoven with the notion of “embracing the world” 
(Humboldt) as a whole, or at least as much as one can by conceptualizing the experienced 
world. In other words, judgements and beliefs should be transformed into objective, 
universal validity, based on the assumption that there is a world in itself towards which 
all particular perspectives are directed. Stojanov explained the self-development of a 
person to be a social practice of world-disclosing:  
Here individuals are developing into subjects who are able to transform their opinions, 
notions and intuitions into concepts. The individuals are developing into undertakers and 
ascribers of commitments and entitlements, into scorekeepers who are able to apply the 
norms […].5 (Stojanov, 2012, p. 83) 
Bildung in the sense of cultivating Mündigkeit implies therefore a special attitude and 
special patterns of action: First, this is the attitude needed: 
To search for sound reasons for one’s own and other’s opinions and claims, second, this is 
the readiness and the ability to transform one’s own intuitions and beliefs into justifiable 
conceptual contents, and finally, this is also the willingness and the ability to discriminate 
between good and bad reasons, that is, to distinguish reasons that have an inter-perspectival 
validity from those that are only expressions from private, purely subjective positions and 
interests. (Stojanov, 2012, p. 84) 
The use of reason has, according to Kant, a private and a public dimension: He demands 
absolute freedom of the public use of reason (Kant, 1784, p. 484). Kant only meant for 
the public use of reason by adult persons who are the members of the relevant 
communities. The results of reasoning about public issues are then to be presented to the 
"audience for evaluation" (ibid, p. 486). In consequence: Every person, while thinking 
and acting explicitly from own reason, contests given assumptions and beliefs, criticizing 
them and adjusting them if necessary. By doing so, the person becomes responsible for 
his or her own reasoning and actions, and must make public his or her own reasons to 
follow (or not follow) the given norms of the society (Kivelä, 2012, p. 62 f.) By using 
reason in the realm of public space we are principally able to be co-creators of this space 
and to free this space of inadequate or obsolete concepts. Mündigkeit as a concept 
therefore implies an autonomous, public action.  
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However, the basic direction and the essential endeavor of enlightenment philosophy is by 
no means exhausted by going through life only in a contemplative way and by mirroring it 
in a reflexive way. It does not provide merely a retrospective review, but the power to shape 
the present way of life. (Faulstich, 2016, p. 54) (emphasis supplied by TK)  
The apparent link between autonomous thinking and acting is perhaps most obvious if we 
approach the famous demand on education made by Theodor W. Adorno and stated in his 
"Education for Mündigkeit": The first and most important goal of education is to see that 
Auschwitz mustn’t happen again. He holds thus that the primary task of all types of 
education is to prevent a possible future Auschwitz, which is used as a symbol of absolute 
evil and barbarism. In order to eliminate existing and to prevent future barbarism, the “de-
barbarization” of the society should to be carried on. The de-barbarization of society is, 
according to Adorno, possible only through education, but a special type which Adorno 
calls “Education for Mündigkeit”. Adorno calls Mündigkeit (sometimes translated in this 
context as autonomy) the only true force against the symbol of Auschwitz. He refers to 
the definition of Mündigkeit by Kant and describes it as a power for reflection, for self-
determination, and for non-participation. The path to a future Auschwitz lays, according 
to Adorno, with blind identification with the collective opinion as well as with 
manipulation by collectives. Adorno claims:  
Autonomy [mündig] is one who speaks for himself because he has thought for himself and 
does not merely parrot [...]. This, however, is proven by the force of resistance to 
predetermined opinions, institutions, and everything that is merely imposed and justifies 
itself only with its existence. (Adorno, 1971, p. 785).  
The blind submission to a collective deprives one of the potential for self-determination 
and grades a person to a material or object, which Adorno called “the reified 
consciousness” (Adorno, [1971]/2013, p. 99). The prototype of "reified consciousness" is 
the "authoritarian character", which is characterized by the inability to make immediate 
human experiences. Without emotion, the person with authoritarian character is 
indifferent to other human beings (Adorno, [1971]/2013, p. 88 ff.). Adorno understands 
Mündigkeit, which depends on the critical judgment of every citizen, as a prerequisite for 
democracy:  
People who blindly integrate themselves into collectives are already making themselves 
into something like material, erasing themselves as self-determined beings. This includes 
the willingness to treat others as amorphous masses. […] A democracy that is not only 
supposed to work, but to perform according to its concept, requires autonomous people. 
(Adorno, [1971]/2013, p. 107)  
No entity has the right to form human beings from the outside according to a given model 
or to forge a person to meet a given standard, according to Adorno (Adorno, [1971]/2013, 
p. 106). Amy Gutman put it similarly: ‘Even if there were someone wiser than Socrates 
in our midst, she still could not claim the right to order the souls of all citizens.’ (Gutmann, 
1989, p. 72). It is precisely the value of Mündigkeit that underwrites Kant’s famous dictum 
that we are morally obligated to treat each individual always as an end in him or herself, 
never as the means to an end. The autonomous person only can build and foster 
democracy because democracy is founded on the independent conscious decision of each 
individual. Bildung has therefore two main, though at first glance contradictory, tasks: On 
the one hand, it should serve the purpose of helping people adapt to the world that they 
live in; on the other hand, it has the task of reinforcing the individual nature and capacity 
to resist that which is given. Bildung is therefore situated between two poles: adaptation 
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and resistance. According to Adorno the overpowering societal structure fosters 
individuals more towards the adapting process, and therefore more education for 
resistance should be encouraged.  
Over the past 50 years, interest in the question of increasing people’s autonomy 
through educational efforts has grown. There has also been more attention paid to the 
development of a common framework for citizenship education emphasizing individuals' 
standing against any kind of oppression. Nussbaum and Sen have inspired an effort to 
develop an understanding of the overlapping capabilities which would enhance the ability 
to exercise a degree of control over one’s lives, to make informed choices, to take part in 
the decision-making processes, and to envisage alternatives to given solutions 
(Boyadjieva & Ilieva-Trichkova, 2018). The questions of learners’ control over the 
learning process and their willingness and ability to manage their own learning endeavors 
have been developed in the context of the theory of self-directed learning (Brookfield, 
201; Candy, 1991). Several authors (of which Paulo Freire was the most prominent) drew 
attention to the issues of the relationship between hegemony and adult education, 
structures of oppression in societies, problems of dynamics of power (and how to 
manipulate these dynamics) and methods of emancipation from diverse situations of 
oppression (Mayo, 1999). Inspired by Freire’s ideas, Jack Mezirow developed a 
transformative learning theory that was aimed at the enhancement of critical thinking and 
education-driven transformations on both individual and collective levels (Taylor & 
Cranton, 2012). The core feature of these diverse approaches (similar to the ideas of 
critical theory) is the belief that developing critical reasoning in learners and citizens is 
indispensable to the proper function of a free, democratic society. All of the 
aforementioned ideas fit together under the overlying concept of autonomy (Mündigkeit). 
Lifelong learning that address both universal and current challenges faced by society 
should still focus on the question of how adults learn to recognize (and resist to) 
ideological domination and manipulation. 
 
How to protect civic education from misuse for political aims? 
The question of the misuse of civic education for political aims has also arisen in Post-
War-Germany – not least due to the historical experience of the Goebbels propaganda. 
After thorough discussions going on for a long-time pedagogues and political scientists 
convened in a sort of didactical Charta, the so-called ‘Beutelsbach consensus’ (its name 
deriving from the small German town Beutelsbach where the conference was held). This 
Charta has been put down on paper in the year of 1976 and has not lost its significance 
until now. In the Germany of today civic (German term: political) education is still based 
on the principles of this Beutelsbach consensus. With the Beutelsbach consensus a stop 
sign has been erected, clearly expressing the message that political education is legitimate 
only if it is not exploited for political purposes. The following passages give a direct 
quotation from that document (Charta of the Beutelsbach consensus): 
1. Prohibition against overwhelming the Pupil: 
It is not permissible to catch pupils unprepared or unawares - by whatever means - for the 
sake of imparting desirable opinions and to hinder them from `forming an independent 
judgement'. […].  
 
2. Treating Controversial Subjects as Controversial:  
Matters, which in intellectual and political affairs are controversial, must also be taught as 
controversial in educational instruction […]. 
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3. Giving Weight to the Personal Interests of Pupils:  
Pupils must be put in a position to analyze a political situation and to assess how their own 
personal interests are affected as well as to seek means and ways to influence the political 
situation they have identified according to their personal interests.6 (Wehling, 1977) 
 
These three principles need further explanation as well as expansion in order to meet the 
current challenges of civic education for adults, connected with modern propaganda. The 
first point of the Beutelsbach consensus makes a clear reference to the concept of 
Mündigkeit as the principal goal of every civic educational process. This point also 
highlights the issue of neutrality of the (liberal) state towards the diverse conceptions of 
a (private) good life. The neutrality of the state, among the diverse conceptions of good, 
is pursued in this case for the sake of opportunity and choice. At the same time this 
doctrine of the democratic state has to find a legitimate and justified foundation. As such, 
Gutman suggests:  
A state of democratic education is minimally objectionable insofar as it leaves maximum 
room for citizens to deliberately shape their society, not in their own image but in an image 
that they can legitimately identify with their own informed, moral choices. (Gutmann, 1989, 
p. 77)  
This premise therefore implies the obligation that civic education has to increase and 
cultivate the capacity for rational deliberation among people from different ways of life.  
The second aspect of the Beutelsbach consensus is closely connected with the idea 
of maintaining pluralism: reasonable pluralism (Rawls) is an indispensable characteristic 
of a democratic society that assures its preservation and development. Reasonable citizens 
are ready to propose and adhere to acceptable rules when living together in society, so 
long that they are certain that others are also doing so. Every reasonable citizen has a 
"comprehensive doctrine," or world view, though he or she should not want to impose 
this doctrine on others. In this sense, the presence of propaganda in interactions or public 
debate between human beings in their roles as homo politicus is a particular danger. 
Propaganda makes it difficult for participants in the debate to be reasonable. If there are 
propaganda attempts, being reasonable should mean then to exclude a certain 
propagandist perspective from the debate. Stanley claims that propaganda, which 
pretends to provide a reasonable contribution to a public debate, destroys the empathy of 
a group (Stanley, 2015, p. 108). Furthermore, propaganda undermines basic features of 
"public reasonableness" such as dignity and respect for the fellow citizen (Stanley, 2015, 
p. 109). So, this second point of the Beutelsbach consensus seems to require further 
explanation when considering the potential for manipulation. The technique of searching 
for balance where there is none could be misused to shift the opinion towards a 
supposedly “ideal compromise”. Not all controversial positions have the same claim to 
truth, and this claim must therefore be thoroughly examined. The concept of truth remains 
thus one of the central points of the discussion about education and propaganda. Here, 
truth is not the schematically calculated, or “golden” center between the expressed 
positions. The search for truth has nothing to do with a “mathematically” calculated 
balance, as the truth can also be "marginal". This marginal position must at least not be 
interpreted as that which has to be "moderated", "corrected" or "mitigated" by other 
positions. A contribution to a (political) debate must be justified, and be assessed solely 
by its impact on the truth of the issue, or what Habermas famously calls ‘the unforced 
force of the better argument’ (Habermas, 2005, p. 20). Timothy Snyder, a historian at 
Yale, speaks about the demolition of truth as an intentional action of propaganda 
machinery that aims to ruin trust in a society. If nobody knows what truth can be, the 
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feeling of mutual distrust spreads throughout society ending in an erosion in any belief in 
authority. For Snyder, to abandon facts is to abandon freedom, and abandoning the search 
for truth means abandoning the basis for judgment and critical reflection (Snyder, 2017). 
Snyder points out that ‘Post-truth is pre-fascism’ (Snyder, 2017, p. 71). In this context the 
concept of a “noble lie” could be mentioned. This idea, developed by Plato, questioned 
whether deception can be justified if its purpose is to protect someone or to mobilize a 
group for supporting a worthy idea. Michael P. Lynch points out that the problem with 
“noble lies” is that ‘they are like potato chips: it is hard to stop with just one,’ and the risk 
is high that, for example, ‘cover-ups become noble lies’ (Lynch, 2016, p. 83). Karl Popper 
(similar to Snyder) sees the noble lie as a part of a totalitarian society (or at least leading 
to one).7 
The third point of the consensus was expounded in the 1990s against a background 
of discussion about civil society and communitarianism:  
The pupil (and adult) must be enabled to analyze political problems, to put him or herself 
in the situation of those who are affected [by these problems], and to search for ways to 
influence solutions in the sense of his or her own well-intentioned self-interest, while taking 
into account the co-responsibility for social coexistence and the community in its various 
manifestations. (Schneider, 1996, p. 220)  
This point emphasizes the demand on education to foster the ability to defend one’s own 
personal and political commitments (if they are defensible). The idea is that educators 
and educational institutions would act not only unprofessionally, but also immorally, if 
they did not take note of the intuitions, desires, fears and biographies of their participants. 
These educators or institutions would be similarly tainted if they denied participants’ 
ability to articulate those intuitions, desires and fears, and therefore prevented the ‘game 
of giving and asking for reasons’ (Brandom, 2002, p. 350), which would mean that the 
ability to argue is an important but not unique precondition for Bildung. Stojanov speaks 
of the necessity to make a jump: from the only narrative expression of one’s own beliefs 
and opinions to their conceptual articulation (Stojanov, 2012, p. 85). What is meant here 
is the ability to generalize particular problems and concepts, to transcend the limitations 
of purely subjective experiences and perspectives, and to recognize principles of the 
“whole world” (without oversimplification and homogenization). 
 
Plasticity of a human being: Bildung and Bildsamkeit/education and educability 
It seems obvious that propaganda and manipulation pose a threat for developing 
autonomy and critical reflection in a population. One of the ways to understand how 
manipulation threatens autonomy and Bildung is to think in terms of self-determination 
and (certain) independence from the external will. But at the same time if one considers 
the preconditions for propaganda and education, the possibility of influencing human 
beings must be considered as well. Propaganda and education, however, are limited by 
the individual’s motivational structure. In German pedagogical theory, the topic of 
vulnerability to influence is discussed under the term "Bildsamkeit" (educability). The 
term “Bildsamkeit,” which was introduced and developed by Hegel, implicitly describes 
the susceptibility of a person to being influenced. This is the fundamental presupposition 
of every pedagogical effort, because it is the only way to trigger a change in a person. 
This tradition reaches into in modern times when a person is seen as homo educandus, a 
lifelong learner, and a plastic and flexible “learning being”. The most important 
representatives of German anthropology such as Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen, or Portman 
postulate that the openness and plasticity of human beings are distinctive features of 
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mankind. Educability is the precondition for education, thus the possibility of education 
requires the ability to be educated as a matter of principle.  
The naturally given educability of a human being is not infinite, however. In his 
anthropology Humboldt has coined the term "powers” (“Kräfte”) as something given to 
a human being by nature, making up his or her very essence. Power is energy that allows 
and facilitates the action of a human being. “Power” by Humboldt can also be understood 
as a resistance to all possible attempts at manipulation:  
How deeply one would delve and how close one would get to the truth always remains an 
unknown dimension of the primitive force, the original ego, and the personality, given with 
birth. The freedom of man rests upon it, and it is, therefore, man’s proper character. 
(Humboldt, 1904, p. 90) 
It is also the power that limits all educational efforts: 
It is precisely this power which, in education, so often misleads our expectations, or makes 
our efforts fruitless. […] No living force behaves by merely suffering against foreign 
exposure. However, it may be strengthened and supported externally, though all that 
happens is by internal energy and is its own work. When we complain about the resistance 
that human nature also offers against a wise Bildung, we must not forget that without such 
a power of repulsion a faculty of appropriation wouldn’t be possible. (Humboldt, 1904, p. 
90) (emphasis by TK)  
It is therefore “power” as an inner trait which (partly) protects a human being from 
manipulation and propaganda.  
Fridenthal-Haase differentiates between “educability” and a general ability to learn. 
To follow the approach of Martin Buber, Friedenthal-Haase considers that the general 
ability to learn is always given, throughout the whole life span. Educability implies the 
possibility of education in the sense of an "essential influence" (Friedenthal-Haase, 1991, 
p. 17). An adult person with a high degree of autonomy and maturity develops resistance 
against fundamental change. In this way, however, the mature person is also at risk of 
reinforcement, of closure, even of "encrustation", as Buber put it. The tendency toward 
reinforcement and closure is, however, characteristic for only the “normal” situation, but 
if a person passes through a period of personal or social crises, he or she is likely to re-
open him or herself to a fundamental change, such as a personal growth or development. 
A severe crisis rousing the person out of his or her sense of security dissolves the feeling 
of ready-made personality and re-opens the possibility of “essential influence” (Buber, 
1934).  
 
Crisis is always a decisive situation of the greatest seriousness, when it comes to the realization 
or failure of ultimate values. It includes the possibility of decay, destruction, death or salvation, 
healing and a new beginning. (Friedenthal-Haase, 1991, p. 21).  
 
So, we can also pose the question: If a person in the time of crisis is open to an “essential 
influence”, is he or she at the same time more susceptible to propaganda? In any case, the 
situation is characterized by a particular dependency on others. In the best case, the result 
of crisis management is, according to Buber, a development of the bonds between the 
people in the newly formed learning and teaching community where ‘man helps man, 
instructs him, and lets himself be instructed by him’ (Buber, 1963, p. 605). Thus, in the 
pursuit of human existence, a human being is constantly in need of guidance on norms 
and ethics. 
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Reluctance to learn and the autonomy of learners 
In order to attract the learning person (especially adult learners) and to facilitate learning 
processes, pedagogical research develops approaches that attempt to reduce or even 
overcome the so-called reluctance to learn (“Lernwiderstände”). Since the 1980s 
innovative didactics have been developed to utilize the interactive method, low-threshold 
offers, and addressee-appropriate language. Visualization methods have proved 
particularly effective. According to different learning theories there are at least two ways 
that a person learns: implicit, unintended learning and intentional learning. Intentional 
learning is learning which is consciously intended by the person. Intentional learning is 
triggered when people encounter problem situations that are caused when their routine is 
no longer successful, or when they are experiencing a clash between their wishes and 
their abilities.8 Here Klaus Holzkamp makes a distinction between defensive learning and 
the expansive learning. We learn expansively coming from own interests and gaining an 
“extension” of our empowerment. Learning under coercion - whatever it may be - is a 
defensive learning (Holzkamp, 1991). Learning opportunities (and, maybe, in a certain 
sense Bildung opportunities) cannot always be considered as a privilege, but sometimes 
may be seen as an annoying impertinence. The so-called "pedagogical index finger" can 
indicate the disesteem of a learning subject (Schäffter, 2000, p. 20). Schäffter points out 
that there are forms of "intelligent learning refusal": the reasonable resistance to learning 
(Schäffter, 2000, p. 21).  
The challenge for education is therefore to arrange and define learning opportunities, 
without causing learners to perceive them as patronizing impositions of learning. 
However, the decision between learning and non-learning remains with the adult student. 
The (adult) learning person must necessarily be recognized as self-responsible subject 
and autonomous actor, who, in the context of his or her own life and future plans must 
deal with the constraints and possibilities of everyday praxis, thus accepting or refusing 
the occasion to learn and change based on his or her own ability to think, to judge and to 
act for him or herself. This would require a certain quality of pedagogical/social relations 
which, referring to Stojanov, can be considered to be a form of “educational justice”: 
(Institutionalized) interaction structures in the education system must enable the 
participants to experience recognition, moral respect and social appreciation. Bildung is 
only possible through social appreciation and recognition which Stojanov calls “cultural-
biographical recognition” (Stojanov, 2006, p. 199). This recognition implies the core 
assumption that every person has the potential for individual autonomy and social 
participation (Stojanov, 2006, p. 164 ff.). “Educational justice” is therefore a precondition 
for human growth and for Bildung which is defined by Stojanov not as a “possession” of 
something but as process of personal development. The phenomenon of injustice in the 
education system must be interpreted as a lack of recognition for every single individual. 
This means ‘Recognizing the ability of all individuals to articulate their personal and 
distinctive, biographically-embedded qualities and competencies so that they can be seen 
as a potential contribution and / or enrichment for the whole society’ (Stojanov, 2007, p. 
43). The center of the competence profile of a teacher's profession is not defined by 
didactic and methodical skills, but the ability to achieve intersubjective recognition. 
Bildung is therefore also about the qualitative improvement of social relationships. 
Bildung is anchored in social conditions; Stojanov asks therefore what standards should 
be fulfilled by these conditions, ‘so that they can foster education and subject’ (Stojanov, 
2011, p. 70). The experience of recognition is considered essential for the maintenance 
of positive identity and capacity for action.       
According to Gertrud Wolf the experience of autonomy is the core motivating factor 
for learning and acting as an adult person. The feeling of being autonomous is an 
Propaganda as a (new) challenge of civic education    [155] 
 
important part of one’s identity, because it opens up opportunities for action in which one 
can judge and act independently of others. Considering autonomy as a necessity, learning 
in adulthood can be accompanied by anxiety or at least stress-inducing feelings. The 
demand for autonomy can thus cause inner opposition to learning processes, or, to use the 
established term, provoke the “Lernwiderstand”. This “opposition” can be, according to 
Wolf, a sign of a successful learning process and of stable autonomy (Wolf, 2013, p. 27). 
To recognize the (adult) learner as an autonomous being means to give him or her full 
respect, to recognize his or her life experience and motives as well as his or her resistance, 
and to deal with it carefully: ‘This fundamental recognition of the autonomy of the learner 
lends the adult pedagogical claim to self-determination its actual dignity’ (ibid.).1  
Once we consider such a perspective we can argue that the ideal tool against 
propaganda and manipulation might not involve an educational strategy to overcome 
resistance to learning, encouraging the learners to gain as much knowledge as possible. 
Rather, a successful strategy might seek to reinforce one’s own position as a reasonable 
stance in the world or one which respect the limits of “educability” determined by the 
person’s powers (Humboldt) and therefore protects space for self-development within the 
framework of the immediate person-world-interaction. 
Gutman points out that ‘a good life must be one that a person recognizes as such, 
lived from the inside, according to one’s own best lights’ (Gutmann, 1989, p. 72). So, it 
is each person’s responsibility to choose and to justify for him or herself a concept of a 
good life, and not that of a philosopher (king) to choose the best life and the best society 
for a given group, because this sense of good must justified by every citizen by accepting 
it as his or her own. The aim of civic education could therefore be to achieve the greatest 
possible balance between consent and disagreement, between transformation and 
integration, and between the capability to personally embrace social issues and to look 
critically upon them from the perspective of the “foreigner” in order to seek the truth. 
 
Emotional competence as “protective umbrella” against propaganda 
Propaganda is supposed to work through simplification and appeals to emotion (such as 
fear, anger, etc.). The problem here lies not in the simple fact that education appeals to 
emotions as well, since education cannot help but address the human being as a whole. It 
is problematic when education misuses emotion in a purposeful way to define and form 
the attitudes and beliefs of the learner, bypassing the learner’s opportunity to reflect 
critically on these beliefs. According to the notion of Mündigkeit, a person acts 
autonomously/mündig when his or her actions are determined by reason, rather than by 
irrational impulses or emotions. For the self-governance of the person, use of reason is 
essential.  
Besides the use of reason and power of judgment, the ability to develop Mündigkeit 
and the process of lifelong Bildung are important. Different thinkers use different 
language: mutual respect, empathy, solidarity etc. In every case it is about recognizing 
the other person as a subject (according to Kant, persons are ends in themselves, not as 
objects9) and as a human being equipped with reason and the ability to provide reasonable 
justification for one’s own beliefs and actions. While emphasizing the notion of autonomy 
                                               
1 The focus on autonomy in this section doesn’t embrace the notion of collective-based identity. The 
reliance on the others and reciprocity is nevertheless an important dimension of human development and 
human growth. This reliance doesn’t automatically undermine personal autonomy; in fact, the feminist 
and communitarians approaches advocate the opposite. The aim of this part of the article is, however, to 
elaborate on individual perspectives, rooted in the tradition of the Enlightenment. 
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as the core aspect of adult education, Eneau looks closely on the interpersonal dimension 
of education and advocates the idea of reciprocity as a precondition for gaining autonomy 
as a result of the reciprocal relationship between individuals (Eneau, 2008).  Stanley 
argues that a democratic society must demand empathy, or the ability to take the 
perspective of another, of its members (Stanley, 2015, p. 101 f.). Martha Nussbaum also 
regards the ability to empathize as one of the most important preconditions for democracy 
and logical thinking outside the restrictive stencils. This includes ‘the ability to imagine 
what the experience of another might be like’ and ‘the ability to see the world as a place 
in which one is not alone—a place in which other people have their own lives and needs, 
and entitlements to pursue those needs’ (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 97). Nussbaum considers 
emotions to be a form of cognition for thinking about things that are important from the 
personal perspective, but often exceed personal control (Plumb, 2014).  For developing 
empathy, according to Stanley (2015, p. 102), one needs an "imaginative capacity" - an 
ability to imagine oneself in the situation of another, as well as the ability to give equal 
weight to different perspectives of fellow citizens. This "imaginative capacity" is the 
distinguishing feature between benevolent paternalism and the democratic culture 
favoring the latter: ‘A benevolently paternalistic society is one in which policymakers 
have empathy with those who are subject to its policies, but do not treat them with equal 
respect’ (Stanley, 2015, p. 101). Following Darwall, Stanley speaks of cognitive empathy 
(ibid.). At the same time, Stanley admits that cognitive empathy is an ideal goal and 
provides an effective basis for another ideal - for the ideal of democracy (Stanley, 2015, 
p. 103). Gutman argues that citizens must be taught ‘mutual respect among persons’ and 
‘rational deliberation among ways of life’ – and this is one of the most difficult challenges 
facing peaceful coexistence in a heterogeneous society.  
 
Conclusions 
Education during the whole life means developing one’s own strategies of action in the 
face of the given social and political situation: by recognizing one’s own situation 
requirements in the context of what is given and by conceiving of possibilities to improve 
one’s own world by intervening in the given. In this sense, education does not mean the 
mediation of knowledge but the development of judgment - the postulate, which has its 
roots in the epoch of Enlightenment. 
The core idea of this article is to root civic education in the tradition of the German 
concept of Bildung and Mündigkeit in order to contrast civic education from propaganda 
or manipulation. We offer several reasons to justify referring to Bildung as an important 
concept which has not lost its meaning and importance in the present day: 1) Bildung 
respects the individual and puts personal development in the center and therefore 2) 
Bildung prohibits any kind of instrumentalisation of a human being 3) Bildung imposes 
the foundation of democratic principle and civic activities 4) with these characteristics 
Bildung can be seen as an effective tool against propaganda and discrimination. 
The special nature of the concept of the Bildung is that education is considered not 
as an individual acquisition of knowledge (with a special emphasis on the instrumental 
function) but as a path to individual and collective self-determination and liberation 
(emancipation). Education is a social process and depends as such on communication, 
exchange, and mutual understanding. Learners are not objects, but subjects in their own 
learning process, at the same time they determine their own study interests and acquire 
the necessary knowledge that they will later reflect upon and apply in practice. Education 
must however be an education ‘for protest and for resistance’, says Adorno. 
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In his last major work, Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, Kant has defined 
the following maxims of good judgement: ‘1. Thinking for oneself. 2. To think oneself 
(in communication with human beings) into the place of every other person. 3. Always 
to think consistently with oneself’ (Kant, 2006, p. 124). This seems to be a good guideline 
for the way in which civic education and propaganda can be separated: The first demand 
formulated by Kant is aimed at the promotion of autonomy/Mündigkeit of the individual 
through education; the second demand stresses the need for empathy and insights into the 
standpoints of the others; the third point requires a coherence of convictions and 
judgments. These are the very aims of a civic education which is based on the traditions 
of emancipation, empowerment and the development of agency. 
 
Notes 
1 https://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016.html (Retrieved August 24, 2017). 
2 The study has not yet been published; the first results have already been presented in numerous newspaper 
reports. The official summary of the results is available at the following link: 
https://sheg.stanford.edu/upload/V3LessonPlans/Executive%20Summary%2011.21.16.pdf (Retrieved 
August 24, 2017). In the study, Wineberg points out the inability of pupils to recognize "fake news". In his 
follow-up study, to be published 2017/2018, Wineburg said to have come to similar conclusions even with 
adults. 
3 Mündigkeit is translated into English as autonomy or maturity. For the reason of accuracy there is a need 
to use the German term “Mündigkeit” at some places of this article. 
4 The term “Bildung” seems to be a specifically German term difficult to translate in any other language. 
For the reason of accuracy, we will use here the German word Bildung without English translation. 
5 Stojanov refers here to the approaches of Robert Brandon and McDowell. 
6 Translation by R. L. Cope: http://www.lpb-bw.de/beutelsbacher-konsens.html 
7 On the contrary, Leo Strauss defends the concept of “noble lies” as necessary myth giving meaning and 
purpose to a stable society (Strauss, 1952). 
8 In the Theory of transformative learning by Mezirow it calls “disorienting dilemma“.  
9 Adorno also requires “turning to subject“ as means to fight the barbarism in the German society after the 
Nazism.  
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